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 This article considers the significance of maternal bonding in people’s 
perceptions of the ethics of surrogacy. Based on ethnographic fieldwork in 
Scotland with people who do not have personal experience of surrogacy, it 
describes how they used this ‘natural’ concept to make claims about the ethics 
of surrogacy and compares these claims with their personal experiences of 
maternal bonding. Interviewees located the maternal bond in the pregnant 
woman’s body, which means that mothers have a ‘nine-month head-start’ in 
bonding with their children. While this valorises it, it also reproduces normative 
expectations about the nature and ethic of motherhood. While mothers are 
expected to feel compelled to nurture and care for their child, surrogate 
mothers are supposed to resist bonding with the children they carry. This article 
explores how interviewees drew on the polysemous nature of the maternal 
bond to make nuanced claims about motherhood, bonding and the ethics of 
surrogacy. 
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‘A Nine-Month Head-Start’ 
 One afternoon towards the end of my fieldwork in northeastern Scotland, 
I was sitting talking with Erin. I had spent quite some time with her and her 
family over the previous eighteen months and had got to know her well. Now, 
she had agreed to let me record an interview with her about her thoughts on 
surrogacy. While her daughter was at nursery school, we talked for a couple 
of hours – about surrogacy, but also about Erin’s personal experience of 
motherhood, which had come somewhat unexpectedly as she had been told 
that she was unlikely to conceive a child after sustaining serious abdominal 
injuries in a car accident as a teenager.  
 Erin, who had always wanted to be a mother, conceived her daughter on 
honeymoon and her pregnancy was a wonderful surprise. She described 
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feeling a ‘special bond’ starting to form with her unborn daughter from the 
moment she had a positive pregnancy test:  
 
[F]or me, part of this special bond was, all the way through the pregnancy, my 
intestines were being kicked to bits, I was the one on the loo twenty times a 
day, but it was actually something that [my husband] could only participate in 
to a point. You know, I could say, ‘ooh look, come and feel this baby kicking’, 
but you already have a psychological and emotional bond … if you like, I got 
a nine-month head-start on the bloke concerned and I think you can’t 
compete with that and I think that makes mummies that carry their own 
children special in their own right.  
 
 By emphasising her intimate, physical connection to her daughter 
through her phrase ‘a nine-month head-start’, Erin located her bond with her 
in both a different time and place, which her husband could not access 
because of his different physiological relationship to her. In this article, I will 
explore the effects of this idea that mothers experience a unique and special 
bond formed during pregnancy with their children in relation to people’s own 
experiences and observations and in terms of their judgements about the 
ethics of surrogacy.  
This article is based on twenty months’ ethnographic research in 
northeastern Scotland between 2006 and 2007, where I investigated what 
surrogacy, which is a practice that has provoked intense and sustained public 
and ethical debate in the UK and elsewhere, means to people who, like Erin, 
are not personally involved in it and how their ethical claims about surrogacy 
relate to their more everyday concerns and values. I was based in a small, 
picturesque village on the Moray Firth coast. The people described in this 
article are white, middle-class and university-educated, they work in the public 
or voluntary sector and they are largely left of centre in their politics.  
I collected data through participant observation and interviews. As a 
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participant observer, I was involved in the lives of around sixty people and 
carried out semi-formal interviews with thirty women and men of various ages. 
I used this methodology to formulate a contextualised analysis of how people 
make ethical judgements, relating my observations of their everyday practice 
to the claims they made about surrogacy in interviews, tracing the 
connections between their moral values and ethical decisions in claims and in 
practice. This paper takes one particular aspect of what they said about 
surrogacy, which is the problem of surrogate mothers (not) forming a bond 
with the children they carry for the intended parents. Rather than treating their 
thoughts about maternal bonding surrogacy in isolation, it also relates their 
observations and experiences of maternal bonding from their own lives in 
order to both provide context to their judgements on surrogacy and to show 
the contingent and strategic ways in which they drew upon the idea of the 
‘natural’ phenomenon of the maternal bond. This focus on maternal bonding 
emerged from the interviewees’ responses.  
The participants in my research talked about surrogacy as an ethical 
issue, discussing the right and wrong ways in which it should be handled, 
typically using the language of nature and naturalness and focusing on the 
emotional ramifications it might have for those involved. They assumed that 
the motivations of intended parents in surrogacy arrangements were self-
evident: they ‘naturally’ wanted to have children ‘of their own’ (i.e. to whom at 
least one of them was genetically related). In our conversations they focused 
much more on surrogate mothers, who seemed to be the most problematic 
parties in these agreements, as they challenge fundamental precepts about 
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both the ‘given’ and ‘made’ aspects of motherhood – and, by extension, 
femininity and kinship.  
 The maternal bond appeared to the participants in my research to be a 
natural phenomenon, and therefore stable, universal and automatic. In fact, in 
our discussions about surrogate mothers bonding or not bonding with the 
children they carry showed, people formulated and expressed it in different, 
and sometimes contradictory, ways. Like nature, which is itself a highly 
polysemous concept, they appealed to the concept of the maternal bond as if 
it were stable, whilst deploying it creatively to make particular and partisan 
claims. It is this multifaceted quality, as well as its association with the natural, 
that gives the maternal bond its rhetorical and moral purchase. Because a 
woman who has gestated and given birth to a child is supposed to give that 
child up to another person’s care at birth, surrogacy destabilises the popular 
status of the maternal bond as a natural phenomenon arising inevitably out of 
embodied experience; it is this aspect of the ethical dilemmas provoked by 
surrogacy that I will concentrate on here. 
 While there is no shortage of work on motherhood and variant forms of 
mothering within the social sciences, the profundity of its significance for how 
we think about ourselves, and our relationships with others, can sometimes 
get lost in the cracks between academic disciplines and in our own 
assumptions about the naturalness of this primary relationship. Some time 
ago, Lee Drummond (1978) examined earlier forms of ‘mother surrogation’ 
including the work of domestic nannies in raising and rearing middle- and 
upper-class English children.1 He showed that, not only is there variation in 
motherhood between different cultures, but that even within English society, 
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the mother concept is, and has historically been, ‘internally inconsistent’ 
(1978: 40). Traditional practices like nannying, fosterage and wet-nursing split 
maternal roles between different women and brought financial reward into 
maternal labour; historically, ‘blood ties’ have been emphasised or de-
emphasised for particular purposes and different aspects of motherhood have 
been more or less defined by physical or emotional nurturance.2   
 The purchase that the mother-child relationship has had on 
psychological theory suggests the deep significance of this relationship to how 
we conceptualise identity, sexuality, kinship and gender, amongst other 
things. From Freud to Bowlby, psychoanalysts and psychologists have 
assumed that unhealthy attachments between mother and child create higher 
risks of mental, and even physical, ill health for the child later in life. 
Attachment theory may have lost some of its former authority for 
psychologists, yet ideas about mother-child bonding are inherent in popular 
parenting culture (see Davis 2008; Eyer 1992; Faircloth 2013; Lee et al 2014; 
Suizzo 2004; Taylor 1998; Wall 2001) and current social and public policy is 
underlain by an assumption that a positive early experience of mother-child 
bonding is vital to giving children the right start in life (see the discussion in 
Lee et al 2014).   
 Scholars working on breastfeeding culture in the Western world have 
shown the kind of moral judgements that inflect motherhood and how 
important concepts of nature are in assessing and accounting for parenting 
practices (see Faircloth, this issue). Glenda Wall has noted that, in 
contemporary Western culture, ‘there is much moral authority inherent in the 
cultural construct of nature, authority that often goes unquestioned and 
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unchallenged’ (2001: 596). Motherhood is thought to be driven by natural 
forces, from the nebulous concept of maternal instinct to the influences of 
hormones such as oxytocin on the body. Along with this, there has been an 
increasing shift towards a ‘child-centred’ intensive parenting philosophy which 
prioritises the needs of children over their parents, yet which also reproduces 
an expectation that mothers will be the primary caregivers and which 
demands high investments of time, money and emotional labour (see Hays 
1996; Faircloth et al 2013; Lee et al 2014).    
As this brief review of relevant literature shows, nature and ideas of 
naturalness are key to ideas about motherhood and, in particular, good 
mothering. Drummond’s analysis reminds us that there is a long history of 
maternal labour being split between different women, but also that 
perceptions of such practices depend on contemporary discourses and ethics. 
Wet nursing became popular in the context of a particular classed division of 
labour but it was also possible because the idea of maternal bonding had less 
salience at the time. As the literature on parenting and breastfeeding shows, 
in a time of heightened awareness of assisted reproductive technologies, 
public concern about parenting practices and more general fears about the 
future of the natural world (Dow 2013), motherhood has become a focus for 
wider anxieties about the future. Ideas about maternal bonding reflect a sense 
that relationships need nurturing, that responsibility needs fostering and that 
nature can help guide good mothering.   
 
 
A Vital Difference 
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 Before discussing the importance of maternal bonding to surrogacy for 
the people I interviewed in northeastern Scotland, in this section I will outline 
their sense of the importance of maternal bonding more generally by 
describing their own experiences and observations of maternal bonding. For 
participants in my research, whether or not they have children, the maternal 
bond is a psychological and emotional attachment that arises naturally and 
inevitably out of embodied experience of pregnancy. Like Erin, they all 
thought of the maternal bond as compelling mothers towards particular kinds 
of behaviours and relationships, including specifically a sense of ultimate 
responsibility for the dependent child.  
 Nina was in her early twenties and worked for an animal conservation 
charity. She comes from the Highlands and her partner is in the RAF. She told 
me that she planned to have children in the future and that if she had trouble 
conceiving ‘naturally’ she would prefer to use assisted conception to adopting, 
because she was concerned that it would not be ‘enough’ for her: 
 
Yeah, it’s just carrying on the family line, I guess, and I don’t know if you’d 
ever have quite the same bond with a child that you’d adopted, even from a 
baby, with a child that had actually come from you and you’d had inside you 
for nine months. I think that’s – it might be different for men and women – 
because, you know carrying a child for nine months, you’re bonding with it for 
all that time. Whereas, adoption, you don’t really get the whole thing, you just 
get the baby, you don’t get the whole experience that goes with it. I think just 
being pregnant, before you even get the child, is a big part of it, and 
something that every woman maybe wants to experience.  
 
For Nina, being pregnant is an important part of being a woman, but carrying 
and giving birth to a child is also about safeguarding the formation of a bond 
between mother and child.  
 I had many conversations with mothers who recounted stories of difficult 
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births and admitted the pressures, as well as the rewards, of parenthood. 
Many of these comments suggested that bonds between mothers and 
children need to be worked on, implying that, while maternal bonding may be 
something that begins ‘naturally’, its full development is not always inevitable 
or automatic, but must be nurtured, though the specific embodied experience 
of pregnancy also implies that women are predisposed towards such 
nurturance. This is consistent with Kelly Davis’ (2008) research amongst 
mothers of different ages in Scotland. Davis found that bonding with their 
children was something that mothers expected to happen, but that in reality it 
entailed work and time. For the mothers she interviewed ‘maternal instinct’ 
was on the one hand a complex of emotions, especially protectiveness and 
deep love, which seemed to arise naturally, while on the other hand it was the 
intimate and personal knowledge of one’s child that comes through knowing 
and caring for her. As Erin talked more about her experience of motherhood in 
her interview, she told me that, ‘Women, biologically, are more genetically 
predisposed to nurture in a far greater way, a different way from men’. She 
told me that she sees female nurturance as both a ‘role’ and a ‘predisposition’ 
and the bond between mother and child is doubly special because it is both 
‘natural’ and ‘social’. 
 Kirsty is a medical researcher in her thirties. At the time of our interview 
she had recently returned to full-time work following maternity leave. Her 
husband looks after their daughter full-time. This reversal of typical parental 
roles was unique amongst those I met during fieldwork. While most would 
approve of such arrangements, they assumed that mothers would usually act 
as the primary caregivers for children. Indeed, Kirsty told me that, if she could, 
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she would have stayed at home with her daughter, but because her husband 
is disabled, it makes more financial sense for her to be the working parent in 
their family.  
 During the course of our interview, I asked Kirsty if she perceived 
differences between her and her husband’s parenting styles. She said: 
 
I think that men and women approach parenthood differently in the time 
leading up to it. Women have the nine months where they’re getting used to 
the idea – your body’s being taken over by this parasite that you’ve got 
growing inside you. Men, although they kind of know what’s going to happen, 
it doesn’t really hit them between the eyes until the moment that the baby 
arrives and then, in our case, it was a bit of a shock to the system. He was 
like, ‘oh my god, I’m a dad!’, but in a good way. 
 
In our case, we approach parenthood in exactly the same way. We have 
pretty much the same views on what is the right or wrong thing to do. The 
difference is that when my daughter cries, I have a physical reaction to it, not 
just an emotional reaction. It’s not quite so bad now she’s a year old, but you 
can feel the hormone rush in response to the crying, which he doesn’t have, 
so I respond more quickly and a little bit more anxiously, and he’s a little bit 
more chilled out – but that’s not a bad thing! I don’t think other than that that 
we approach it any differently. (Emphasis added) 
 
 Kirsty was keen to emphasise what she and her husband share, which is 
the values they bring to parenthood, yet she nonetheless identified a 
difference in the physicality of her bond to their daughter, referring, like others, 
to the nine-month period of pregnancy to differentiate her experience as a 
parent and the bond with her daughter from her husband’s, though she 
suggested this is an initial difference that will ultimately be evened out. While 
she used a physiological idiom for both of them, she perceived a different time 
span for the process of bonding, so while her body was ‘taken over by this 
parasite’ from conception, her husband was not physically ‘hit … between the 
eyes’ by fatherhood until their daughter was born, which was a ‘shock to the 
system’. 
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Erin saw motherhood as one of the most important and transformative 
experiences of her life. In particular, she described being ‘hit with this massive 
responsibility, or a notion of responsibility, which just explodes when the child 
arrives’. Other interviewees also assumed that feeling such a close 
connection to her child would drive her mother to take ultimate responsibility 
for caring for and nurturing her. Given that they believed the maternal bond to 
be a natural phenomenon, it is perhaps unsurprising that most believed this 
would have an effect on how mothers and fathers cared for their children. This 
is demonstrated by Amy’s comments. At the time of our interview, Amy was in 
her early thirties, single, did not have children and worked in environmental 
education. She told me:  
   
I think the mum has a stronger bond at the beginning, but I think that’s just to 
do with carrying the baby around for nine months. But then, the dad seems to 
be kind of more doting and spoils the child a lot more sometimes. So, I think 
the mother – it’s kind of stereotypical – but the mother always seems to be 
the more kind of practical one and does the basic care of the child, whereas 
the dad is usually the one that comes in and spoils the children and plays with 
them.  
 
 Interviewees were evenly split in whether they thought that a mother’s 
bond to a child would be stronger or more special than a father’s throughout 
their child’s life or if this difference would eventually even out. But, while 
people disagreed about how far-reaching the effects of the mother-child bond 
may be in time, they all assumed that the physical, hormonal and emotional 
realities of pregnancy and labour offer the right conditions for a ‘special’ 
relationship to grow between mother and child. Their repeated references to 
the nine-month gestation period show the significance of time in maternal 
bonding: while maternal bonding is set in motion by natural and physical 
processes, it must be nurtured to develop properly.   
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While they were supportive of gender equality, in talking about the 
maternal bond, the participants in my research foregrounded biologically 
determinist ideas of gender difference to make a claim for the specialness of 
motherhood. They saw this specialness as bringing rewards and costs. By 
associating the responsibilities of parenthood with the maternal bond, which is 
seen as being closely related to the physical intimacy of pregnancy and birth, 
it becomes both a biological and ethical expectation for a mother to form a 
close bond with her child and this has implications for the way in which 
parenthood is thought to properly impact on her life (see also Ginsburg 1989; 
Rapp 1999). Given the strong and recurrent feelings of bonding which people 
expected to be generated during pregnancy and which shape the ensuing 
relationship between parent and child, what happens when pregnancy, 
bonding and parenting are separated between different women?  
 
 
Surrogacy and the Maternal Bond  
The continued coverage of surrogacy arrangements in the media and 
the ongoing debate over surrogacy in feminist philosophy (see Anderson 
1990; Corea 1985; Stanworth 1987; Zipper and Sevenhuijsen 1987 for some 
early and influential examples and Cooper and Waldby 2014 for a more 
recent approach) show how surrogacy provokes intense cultural, ethical and 
political anxieties (see Cook et al 2003; Edwards et al 1993; Strathern 1992a, 
1992b, 2003). This continues to this day, though the focus of research most 
recently has turned to the burgeoning transnational surrogacy industry.  
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Clearly, surrogacy can be distressing and exploitative for those 
involved and as such it has rightly received attention from bioethicists, 
feminist scholars and from the point of view of reproductive justice. But, on the 
level of public debate and ethical judgements in the UK which is my focus 
here, the reason why it is so contentious is because it upturns taken-for-
granted beliefs about the nature of motherhood and challenges normative 
ideas about motherhood, kinship and femininity. Where once maternity 
seemed certain because a child’s mother could only be the woman who had 
given birth to her, with surrogacy and ova donation, opportunities to have 
more than one ‘biological’ mother are opened up (Konrad 2005; Ragoné 
1994; Strathern 2003), though as discussed above, practices like wet-nursing 
show that motherhood has never been entirely singular. However, as Sarah 
Franklin (2013) has recently shown, despite the challenges that assisted 
reproductive technologies present to deeply held views about kinship, 
parenthood and gender, in practice they often have the effect of reinforcing 
heteronormative models of family formation and conjugal relationships. 
Surrogacy, like other assisted reproductive technologies, has 
traditionally been studied by social scientists in infertility clinics and surrogacy 
agencies, and from the point of view of those using this reproductive 
technology (see Ragoné 1994; Roberts 1998; Teman 2003, 2010; Thompson 
2001). One exception to this rule has been Susan Markens’ (2007) 
comparative study of surrogacy regulation in the states of New York and 
California. Of particular relevance to my analysis here is Markens’ focus on 
‘discursive frames’ in the debates in each state. In both New York and 
California, both pro- and anti-surrogacy camps referred to ‘the best interests 
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of the child’ and the ‘freedom to choose’ in making opposing arguments (see 
Edwards et al 1993 for some parallels in the British debates around assisted 
conception in the 1980s and Ginsburg 1989 on the American abortion 
debate). Similarly, we shall see in the following discussion that the 
participants in my research appealed to apparently stable concepts of 
genetics, biology and nature, but to make different and in some cases 
contradictory claims.    
As Markens’ analysis shows, surrogacy has an important place in the 
public imagination as an ethical ‘problem’ that crosses, or at least stretches, 
ethical boundaries. Viewed from the outside, it seems to signify changing 
family constitutions, scientific and technological progress, the ability of people 
to overcome what once seemed natural or god-given conditions and the 
possibility that women’s reproductive capacities might become subject to 
market forces. It is this gap between public and policy discussions of 
surrogacy on the one hand and personal experiences that my research 
addresses, by asking what people who do not have a personal stake in 
surrogacy, but who are aware of the practice through media and public 
debate, think about its ethics. 
 Although there are suggestions that informal surrogacy arrangements 
have always existed, surrogacy decisively entered the British public arena in 
the 1980s with the case of Kim Cotton, the UK’s first, and so far only, 
‘commercial’ surrogate mother. Cotton, a married mother of two, carried a 
baby on behalf of a Swedish couple who paid her £6,500 in an arrangement 
organised by an American surrogacy agency working in southeast England, 
though in fact she received far more money for selling her story to a 
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newspaper (Cotton and Winn 1985). Her case provoked a media storm and 
led to the hasty establishment of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act (1985), 
which bans profit-making agencies from working as surrogacy ‘brokers’, the 
advertising of surrogacy services and the payment of compensation ‘beyond 
reasonable expenses’ by intended parents to surrogate mothers.  
 Fenella Cannell (1990: 674) has argued that Cotton was a culturally 
problematic figure because she had failed to bond with the child she carried 
as a surrogate. Despite the fact that she was thereby fulfilling the obligation 
she had made to the intended parents, in the contemporary uproar, her 
actions came to represent quintessentially ‘bad’ and ‘unnatural’ maternal 
behaviour. Maternal bonding is crucial in people’s judgements about 
surrogacy because it is both a template for good feminine and maternal 
behaviour and a concept in which, as Cannell says, the moral and biological 
seem to be fused in one relationship.   
Surrogacy disturbs normative ideas of maternal bonding, maternal 
responsibility and more widely, feminine behaviour, because a surrogate is 
supposed, and in some sense morally obliged, to relinquish the child she has 
borne to someone else’s care. With surrogacy, the expectation that a 
pregnant woman will naturally ‘bond’ with the child she is carrying collides with 
her obligation to uphold her bond of trust3 to the intended parents. This 
exposes the fact that maternal bonding might not be as natural and automatic 
as might be assumed. However, if a surrogate mother does bond with the 
child she is carrying, she will find it difficult, or perhaps impossible, to 
relinquish her to the intended parents. Thinking about maternal bonding from 
the perspective of surrogacy is therefore an opportunity to examine and 
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explore the nature, and the naturalness, of the maternal bond more carefully 
and I turn now to what the participants in my research thought about maternal 
bonding in surrogacy. 
 Fiona, a divorced teacher in her early fifties with one adult daughter, 
was generally pro-surrogacy. She was, however, concerned that a surrogate 
would find it difficult to hand over a baby and saw this as the greatest risk for 
all parties to a surrogacy arrangement. She said:  
 
I know that I could never have handed over a baby that I had borne. I would 
find that completely impossible, and that’s not a rational decision based on 
any kind of belief, I just simply couldn’t do it. … Some women don’t have 
nearly such a strong maternal sense. To me, it would be like cutting off my 
hand, I couldn’t do it. 
  
 Luke, a graduate student in his late twenties with no children, described 
the bond between a surrogate mother and child in a very similar manner to 
that used by others to describe the bond between a conventional mother and 
child:  
 
I can fully understand the attachment after having gone through all the 
process of having the baby growing inside you must, you can’t shut yourself 
off from that, you can’t treat it like it’s a job, so I can understand the emotional 
attachment. … It must be very natural for a mother to want to keep the baby.  
 
Luke suggests that it is natural that a surrogate should form a bond with the 
child she has carried, so it would be unnatural for her to ‘reject’ this bond by 
relinquishing her to her intended mother. Yet, to do so would be to abrogate 
her obligations towards the intended parents. 
 Roughly half of interviewees interpreted the hypothetical ‘nightmare 
scenario’ of a surrogate mother refusing to relinquish the child as a question 
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of whether the child was, in fact, ‘hers’ (cf. Warnock 1985: 47). Nina said quite 
bluntly, ‘Well, it’s not her baby, is it? … Biologically, it’s not hers. I mean, she’s 
[just] carried it’.4 Nina’s assumption that gestational surrogacy, where the 
surrogate carries a foetus which has been conceived from the intended 
parents’ gametes using IVF, was the most common form of surrogacy, 
suggests a desire to minimise the more culturally problematic aspects of 
surrogacy. In fact in the UK amongst heterosexual intended parents it is not 
as common as ‘traditional surrogacy’, in which the surrogate is artificially 
inseminated with the intended father’s sperm.  
 Andrew, a conservation volunteer in his mid-twenties who had no 
children, also argued that a gestational surrogate who lacks a genetic link with 
the child would have a less valid claim to motherhood:  
 
I think that, while the nine month period is very, very important, I don’t think 
that, if she doesn’t have any genetic link and she’s been aware from the first 
instance that it was almost a business relationship – and I’d imagine they’d 
sign contracts these days, anyway – I don’t think I would grant custody [to the 
surrogate] if I were a judge in that situation. 
  
Surrogacy contracts are legally unenforceable in the UK, which 
prioritises the gestational mother’s claim to parenthood until a Parental Order 
has been issued transferring parental rights to the intended parents. Britain 
has therefore experienced a small number of legal cases concerning 
surrogacy. In the fairly recent case of TT (a minor) ([2011] EWHC 33 (Fam)), 
a British judge found in favour of a surrogate mother who claimed the baby 
she had carried for the intended parents as hers. Mr Justice Baker summed 
up his position, saying, '[the] natural process of carrying and giving birth to a 
baby creates an attachment which may be so strong that the surrogate 
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mother finds herself unable to give up the child' (quoted in Gamble and 
Ghevaert 2011). Interestingly, in his judgement, the judge did not refer to the 
fact that the surrogate was a ‘traditional surrogate’ and was therefore 
genetically related to the child she had carried, but focused instead on the 
‘attachment’ created by the ‘natural process’ of pregnancy and labour, 
implying, in line with Fiona and Luke’s judgements, that this in itself is a 
sufficient basis from which to claim motherhood.   
 Luke and Fiona expected a surrogate mother to form a bond with the 
child because the maternal bond arises naturally out of the embodied 
experience of pregnancy. According to this reasoning, it is difficult to 
completely refute either a traditional or gestational surrogate mother’s claim to 
the child since, as Luke said, ‘it must be very natural for a mother to want to 
keep the baby’. Nina and Andrew, meanwhile, claimed that the maternal bond 
comes from genetic kinship, so it would be impossible to deny a traditional 
surrogate’s claim to motherhood, while gestational surrogacy is acceptable as 
the intended mother’s claim represents a more comfortable balance of both 
biological and social motherhood. In making these distinct claims, each set of 
participants draws on the concept of the maternal bond as a natural – and 
therefore given – phenomenon.  
  
 
A Natural Feeling 
  The idea that a surrogate mother might decide to assert parental 
rights over the child she has carried for the intended parents was often 
expressed by interviewees as a ‘change of mind’, based on the assumption 
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that feelings of attachment to the child might ‘kick in’, causing her to feel that 
she was, after all, her mother. In talking about surrogacy and maternal 
bonding, interviewees often mentioned feelings and emotion. They described 
emotions as physical, embodied experience and the maternal bond as a 
feeling of attachment that compels a mother to respond to her child 
appropriately.  
 When I talked to Lizzy, a student in her late teens without children, about 
surrogacy, she mentioned that a friend of hers has once offered to act as a 
surrogate in the future for a mutual gay male friend of theirs if he ever decided 
to have children. Lizzy told me she admired her friend’s generosity, but 
explained that she would not be able to do it herself: ‘I am a very emotional 
person and I am not sure if I would be able to cope emotionally being a 
surrogate mother’, adding, ‘after going through the emotional rollercoaster of 
having a child and then to give it to someone else even if that was already 
established beforehand, I don’t think I would be able to do it’.  
 Many believed that some process of psychological assessment would be 
appropriate before a surrogacy arrangement was set up, suggesting that 
counselling should be provided to the parties involved (but especially the 
surrogate mother), not only to provide emotional support but also as a means 
of vetting potential surrogates by weeding out those who are not emotionally 
fit for the role (see also Hirsch 1993). This idea that the assessment of a 
potential surrogate’s psychological state may act as a competent measure of 
her fitness for the role is commensurate with British clinical practice, as 
surrogates and intended parents are expected to attend repeated counselling 
sessions throughout the entire process (Brinsden 2003). By insisting that the 
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surrogate be emotionally strong, in itself a difficult thing to measure, people 
implicitly set limits on surrogacy’s availability.  
 The participants in my research agreed that ‘altruism’, or feelings of love 
and sympathy towards the intended parents, was the best motivator for a 
surrogate mother but the vast majority also believed that surrogate mothers 
are entitled to receive some payment for their service.  As Cannell has 
pointed out, if surrogates can claim to be motivated by altruism towards the 
intended parents, even if they are also paid, then it may be easier to frame 
their behaviour as acceptable within wider cultural ideologies of femininity. 
 In her classic study of commercial surrogacy arrangements in the USA, 
Helena Ragoné (1994) observed that intended parents are encouraged to 
nurture their surrogates, thereby cultivating feelings of attachment between 
them in order to make their obligation to relinquish the child when she is born 
all the more compelling. The participants in my research assumed that if she 
were motivated by altruism then a surrogate would feel better about what she 
had done, because she could emphasise her motivation to help someone 
over the fact that she had ‘failed’ to form a maternal bond and ‘given up’ a 
child. For those who were in favour of surrogacy, the surrogate’s ‘unnatural’ 
relinquishing of the child she has carried is obviated by her altruistic act of 
helping another, with whom she has, or has come to form, a bond of 
sisterhood or friendship that can replace the bond she might have formed with 
the child. In the British context, which prohibits payment of the surrogate 
mother, this could also provide a ‘reward’ for the surrogate mother.   
 As Catherine A. Lutz (1988) has argued in her classic work, emotions 
confound the Cartesian splitting of mind and body, because they are thought 
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to originate in the mind but be felt in the body. Because they are seen in 
Western cultures as arising out of an individual’s particular psyche, their social 
nature is rarely appreciated. As Lutz (1988: 4) argues, we need to recognise 
that emotions are as much an index of social relations as external 
manifestations of individuals’ inner states. As this case of people speculating 
about the emotional state and drives of surrogate mothers shows, the 
language of emotions is an important clue to wider ethical values and 
‘structures of feeling’ (Williams 1977). The example of surrogacy also reminds 
us that ideas about motive and human nature are gendered – women are 
expected to be naturally compelled towards altruism and this is exemplified by 
motherhood.  
 Another important point made by Lutz is that emotions are strongly 
associated with nature and biology, which makes them appear given and 
inescapable. Here, when people talked about the emotional strength of the 
surrogate mother, they were not only connecting mind and body through the 
language of emotions, but also talking about nature. The concerns people 
expressed to me about the consequences of a surrogate forming a bond with 
the child and her emotional state, particularly at the moment of postpartum 
handover, show the cultural and moral significance of this defining act in the 
surrogacy arrangement. Surrogacy is troubling because the surrogate is 
expected to resist a natural feeling that is supposed to be so strong and 
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Surrogacy is interesting to social scientists precisely because, in the 
debates that surround it, norms of motherhood, femininity and kinship 
become, in Strathern’s (1992a) terms, ‘literalised’. The ethical dilemmas 
provoked by surrogacy demonstrate that motherhood is heavily laden with 
moral values which inscribe expectations for proper behaviour and 
relationships and which are articulated in the language of nature, genetics, 
biology and embodied feeling. Any challenge to maternal bonding, like the 
relinquishing of a child by a surrogate mother, seems to represent a threat to 
our most basic relationship and source of identity.  
The data presented here demonstrate that, for the participants in my 
research, the maternal bond is a natural phenomenon with powerful effects on 
our understandings of kinship and gender and on the organisation of 
parenting. It shows that maternal bonding, while ‘natural’, needs to be worked 
on. Putting time, care and effort into bonding with their children is the primary 
act of maternal labour and responsibility.  
Various anthropologists have shown the way that those personally 
involved in surrogacy arrangements use concepts like nature and maternity 
strategically, in order to place surrogacy within a more socially acceptable 
frame (see Ragoné 1994; Thompson 2001). As we have seen here, maternal 
bonding is not a rigid ideology but one that encompasses a range of both 
given and made aspects. Nonetheless, its naturalness was never questioned 
– for the people I interviewed in Scotland, the maternal bond can still be 
‘natural’ whether it is based in gestational or genetic kinship. Nature has long 
been associated with automatic and instinctual behaviours, but, as this special 
issue argues, it is also a concept with great ethical force and moral authority 
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in the contemporary Western world. It is little wonder, then, that the idea of 
maternal bonding has such potency.  
 While the maternal bond is a particularly robust concept, participants in 
my research disagreed about its specific form and effects. They did not 
suggest that fathers lack a connection with their children, nor did they doubt 
that intended parents in surrogacy arrangements would bond with their 
children, but they did assume that mothers who have carried and given birth 
to children experience a qualitatively different – or ‘special’ – bond. They 
differed on whether this is an initial difference or a more long-term one. 
Similarly, while this difference was closely associated with the physical 
experience of maternity, different people emphasised various aspects of this, 
including pregnancy, labour, breast-feeding and responses to the sound of a 
child crying.  
The maternal bond informs expectations about mothers’ different 
responsibilities and identities in all spheres of life. Locating it in the pregnant 
woman marks off motherhood as special, unique and somewhat mysterious. 
This provides mothers with pleasurable and rewarding feelings of attachment 
to their children and access to a highly valued status. But the idea of the ‘nine-
month head-start’ has significant ramifications for how parental labour is 
organised. The term ‘bond’ encompasses notions of physical constraint and 
obligation as well as emotional attachment. Good mothering is thought to 
entail self-sacrifice, selflessness and a strong sense of responsibility; these 
expectations are compelled by the feelings of attachment that women are 
expected to form with their children from pregnancy onwards. It therefore 
seems ‘natural’ that mothers will also be the primary caregivers of their 
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children, because they feel physically and emotionally compelled to do so by 
their bond with their child.  
For the participants in my research, the surrogate mother epitomised 
the anomalous and ethically fraught nature of surrogacy, and talking about her 
‘unnatural’ act of rejecting a child she had borne made their ideas about 
maternal bonding and the nature of motherhood explicit. So, while surrogacy 
seems on the one hand to challenge fundamental ethical values and axioms 
of kinship and parenting, it also causes people to reproduce normative ideas 
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1 Of course the particular ideas about motherhood and surrogacy discussed here are located 
in a particular socio-economic milieu. Not only are the participants in my research middle-
class, but it is generally assumed that assisted conception including surrogacy is most 
commonly sought by middle- and upper-class intended parents. Though it is difficult to get 
accurate figures on this, there is some evidence to suggest that at least in commercial 
surrogacy, surrogates are more likely to be working class than intended parents (see Ragoné 
1994). Furthermore, while the public debate around surrogacy crosses class and party 
political boundaries, on the whole, the most influential figures in terms of policy have been 
lawyers, journalists and ethicists. This is reflected in much of the anthropological work on 
assisted conception, with the notable exception of Edwards’ (2000) work in Lancashire.  
2
 See also Strathern (2003; 1992b) for a discussion of whether the ethical dilemmas 
presented by surrogacy are as novel as they might at first appear.  
3 Of course, the word ‘bond’ has a further, financially inflected meaning, which is worth 
bearing in mind given the contentious debate over commercial surrogacy. 
4
 Notably, when talking about her own reproductive plans as quoted in the previous section, 
Nina emphasised the importance of experiencing pregnancy, yet with surrogate motherhood 
she sidelines gestation.  
